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Any views expressed in this paper are the authors￿ and do not necessarily reflect those of the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics.   I. Introduction   
The relationship between wages and productivity is fundamental to labor economics.  In 
this paper, we examine this relationship using subjective measures of worker productivity from 
the Employment Opportunity Pilot Project (EOPP) data.  We seek to answer the following 
questions.  To what extent are differences in productivity between workers on the same job 
reflected in their relative wages?  To what extent is productivity growth reflected in wage growth?  
To what extent can data on wage and productivity growth, and the relative wages and 
productivity of workers on the same job, identify the division of returns to human capital and the 
extent to which wages are compressed relative to productivity? 
We follow Bishop’s (1987) paper in examining the relationship between wages and 
productivity in the EOPP data.  Bishop (1987) finds that direct measures of productivity reported 
by the employer have quite weak effects on wages and notes that indirect indicators of 
productivity such as relevant experience have stronger effects.  We extend Bishop’s research by 
using these indicators as instruments for the noisy measures of productivity. 
In the simplest static model of a competitive labor market, the relationship between 
productivity and wages is straightforward:  wages equal marginal product.  In dynamic models, 
such as Becker (1962), this equality need not always hold.  In Becker￿s model, workers bear the 
full cost and return to acquiring general human capital, so general human capital acquisition does 
not affect the equality of wages and productivity.  In contrast, the costs and returns to acquiring 
skills specific to the employer are shared between the employer and the worker, so that wages 
are above marginal productivity before training and below productivity after training.  More 
recent models and empirical work
1 suggest that employers share the costs and returns to general 
                                                 
1For examples, see Acemoglu and Pischke (1998,1999), Loewenstein and Spletzer (1998), Chang and Wang (1996), 
Autor (2001), Balmaceda (2005), Bishop (1991), Harhoff and Kane (1997), and Booth and Bryan (2002).   2
as well as specific human capital.  Even if worker realize the full return and bear the full cost of 
training, market frictions such as search costs (Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) and Zoega and 
Booth (2005) may cause wages to diverge from productivity.  In addition, as suggested by 
Akerlof and Yellen (1990) and others, social norms may constrain wages from fully reflecting 
productivity differentials.  We refer to the phenomenon of differences in wages less than fully 
reflecting differences in productivity, for reasons other than the sharing of the costs of human 
capital acquisition, as "wage compression".   
As detailed below, the EOPP data contain measures of a recently hired worker￿s 
productivity at various points in time.  Labor economists typically abstract away from the fact 
that wages are not adjusted continuously.  However, our data show that productivity typically 
grows quite rapidly at the start of a job.  Since wages are not adjusted continuously, starting 
wages very likely reflect not just the low productivity at the very start of the job but also the 
much greater productivity typically attained within a few weeks.  We develop a method that 
allows us to take this into account in estimating the relationship between starting wages and 
productivity.   
Our data allow us to estimate how productivity growth affects wage growth in the first 
two years in a job, and how differences in starting productivity between workers affect starting 
wages.  We show that under reasonable assumptions, if one regresses differences in starting 
wages for workers in the same job on differences in starting productivity and differences in 
productivity growth, the coefficient on starting productivity identifies the extent to which starting 
wages are compressed.  The coefficient on differences in productivity growth in the same 
regression identifies the extent to which employers share the cost of general human capital 
acquisition.  3
Our results show a dramatic amount of wage compression.  Our point estimate from our 
benchmark specification is that only 32 percent of differences in starting productivity are 
reflected in differences in starting wages, even after accounting for differences in productivity 
growth.  The hypothesis that starting wages equal starting productivity after taking into account 
human capital acquisition is decisively rejected.  Our results also indicate that productivity 
growth translates into substantially lower wage growth: productivity growth of 10 percent results 
in wage growth of only 2.6 percent.  This reflects employer sharing of the costs and returns to 
human capital acquisitions and/or increased wage compression over time.  Unfortunately, we do 
not obtain a precise estimate of the amount of employer sharing of human capital investment per 
se. 
The great extent of wage compression poses a challenge to theories of wage 
determination.  Existing theories of wage compression seem unlikely to explain the magnitude of 
compression that we find.  This is especially true in view of the fact that our wage compression 
coefficient is to a great extent identified by differences in relevant experience.  That employers 
would pay experienced workers their marginal products seems intuitive and is the basis of 
Becker’s (1962) prediction that employers do not share the costs to general human capital.  In our 
final section we briefly develop a model that generates wage compression via equity norms that 
prevent employers from paying experienced workers hired from the outside more than workers 
with the same skills trained at the firm.  The ￿equity norm￿ not only leads to wage compression, 
but also amplifies any initial tendency toward employer sharing of the return to general human 




II.  Identifying the Relationship Between Wages and Productivity Using the EOPP Data 
EOPP is one of the few surveys that we are aware of that has information on the 
productivity of individual workers.
2  The EOPP items on the productivity of the last worker hired 
and the typical worker at various points in time and the availability of instruments such as a 
worker￿s relevant experience elsewhere and job complexity make the data an ideal source for 
analyzing the relationship between productivity and wages.  The EOPP data have been analyzed 
fairly extensively, but the relationship between wages and productivity has been under-explored.  
We use the data to estimate the rate at which productivity growth during the first two years of 
employment translates into wage growth and the extent to which productivity differences among 
workers who are hired for the same position are reflected in differences in starting wages. 
Description of the EOPP Data 
The EOPP data come from a 1982 survey sponsored by the National Institute of 
Education and the National Center for Research in Vocational Education.  Employers are asked a 
series of questions about the wages, experience, productivity, and training activities of the last 
worker hired and the typical worker in the same position.
3  Descriptive statistics can be found in 
Table 1. 
For our purposes, the key EOPP data are the information on wages and productivity.  
Employers in the survey are asked about the starting wage paid to the last worker hired and the 
average hourly wage paid to workers who have had two years￿ experience in the position.  In 
addition, employers in the EOPP survey are asked about the productivity of the last worker hired 
                                                 
2 The Small Business Administration survey, which is modeled after EOPP, also has information on worker 
productivity; see Barron, Black, and Berger (1999).  There are a few company data sets with information on 
productivity.  Using performance ratings at a major corporation, Medoff and Abraham (1981) find that that within-
grade-level seniority ￿ earnings differentials cannot be explained by performance differentials.  Analyzing the 
personnel records of a large company, Bartel (1995) finds that training is positively related to both wage growth and 
performance. 
3 For more information about the survey and the training questions, see Barron, Black, and Loewenstein (1989).  5
and the typical worker in the position during the first two weeks of employment and from the 
￿third week to the twelfth week at work.￿  Employers in the survey also provide an estimate of 
the productivity of the ￿typical worker who has been in this job for two years.￿  In forming their 
productivity estimates, employers are told to rate workers on a ￿productivity scale of zero to one 
hundred, where one hundred equals the maximum productivity any of your employees can attain 
and zero is absolutely no productivity.￿
4        
As mentioned in the introduction, our key extension of Bishop’s (1987) research on 
wages and productivity using these data is to correct for measurement error in productivity by 
using IV.  For IV to produce consistent estimates, measurement error in log productivity must be 
uncorrelated with true log productivity.  One possible objection to our procedure is that the 
employers answering the EOPP productivity question may tend to exaggerate productivity 
differences between workers (and also exaggerate productivity growth).  Suppose that an 
employer￿s productivity estimate is given by 
e p p + + = * ln ln 1 0 α α , 
where p* is true productivity and e is a mean-zero error uncorrelated with ln p*.  If α 1 > 1 (that is, 
if reported productivity differences are greater in magnitude than actual productivity differences), 
then measurement error will be positively correlated with ln p* and IV estimation of the effect of 
log productivity on wages will underestimate the coefficient on log productivity.
5   
Examining the data, we find that the average coefficient of variation for productivity for 
jobs where we have observations for two workers, using observations where the worker has been 
on the job for more than 0.8 years, is 0.20 (this is the case for both productivity during the first 
                                                 
4 Employers also provide information on the productivity and starting wage of the previously most recently hired 
worker in the same position as the last worker hired, but this information is unfortunately missing in the majority of 
observations.   
5 Bollinger and Chandra (2005), writing about general models of measurement error,  note that "[t]o our knowledge, 
no study has ever found [α 1] > 1."    6
two weeks and productivity from the third to the twelfth week; other tenure cutoffs give similar 
results).  This is almost identical to the average found in a review of studies examining variation 
in output for which physical measures existed (Schmidt and Hunter 1983), so there is no 
evidence that our productivity measure exaggerates differences between workers. 
We estimate log productivity growth over the first two years as the difference between 
the typical worker￿s log productivity after two years and the most recent hire’s log productivity 
after two weeks.  As can be seen in Table 1, average productivity growth over the first two years 
is very high: productivity after two years is on average eighty percent higher than productivity at 
the start of the job.   
We can decompose productivity growth over the two year period into productivity 
growth occurring at the very start of the employment relationship and productivity growth 
occurring after the twelfth week.  Specifically, we estimate log productivity growth over the first 
three months as the difference between log productivity from the third to the twelfth week and 
log productivity during the first two weeks (given the way the question is worded, this may be an 
underestimate); productivity growth from the twelfth week on is estimated as the difference 
between log productivity after two years and log productivity from the third to twelfth week.  As 
reported in Table 1, productivity during the third to twelfth week is on average 51 percent higher 
than productivity during the first two weeks while productivity after two years is 29 percent 
higher than during the third to twelfth week.  Apparently then, productivity does not grow evenly 
over the first two years, but is heavily concentrated toward the start of the job: at least two-thirds 
of the growth in productivity over the first two years occurs during the first three months. 
Besides the information on productivity and wages, EOPP also contains many additional 
variables that are useful for our analysis.  As alluded to above, EOPP provides fairly detailed  7
information on both formal and informal training.  Employers indicate the number of hours 
during the first three months of employment that were spent providing formal training through 
￿self-paced learning programs or ￿ by specially trained personnel￿ to not only the last worker 
hired, but also to the typical worker in the same position.  With respect to informal training, 
employers provide information on the number of hours during the first three months of 
employment that management and line supervisors spent giving individualized training to the last 
worker hired and the typical worker in the same position.  Employers also indicate the number of 
hours that co-workers who are not supervisors spent away from their normal work giving 
informal individualized training to the last worker hired and the typical worker.  Finally, 
employers indicate the total number of hours during the first three months of employment that 
the average new employee in the position spends in training activities watching other people do 
the job rather than doing it himself.   
Two other items in the data are also relevant for our analysis.  There is information on the 
most recently hired worker￿s relevant employment experience in jobs ￿that had some 
application￿ to the position for which he was hired.  In addition, employers estimate the number 
of weeks it takes a new employee in the most recently filled position to become fully trained and 
qualified if he or she has the necessary school provided training but no experience in the job.  As 
discussed by Barron, Black, and Berger (1999) and Frazis and Loewenstein (2005), the latter 
variable can be thought of as capturing job complexity.    
Framework for Empirical Analysis 
The EOPP data enable us to estimate two equations: a regression of differences in starting 
wages on differences in starting productivity for workers in the same job and a regression of 
wage growth on worker productivity growth.   As described above, EOPP has information on  8
both formal and informal training.  As reported in Loewenstein and Spletzer (1999), the 
employers in EOPP report that most of the skills the new employee learns on the job are useful 
elsewhere.
6  Still, we allow for the possibility that some human capital is employer-specific.  We 
assume that human capital acquisition has the multiplicative structure ln H = ln G + ln S, where 
G and S are the worker￿s stocks of general and specific human capital, respectively, and H is 
equal to productivity.     
Workers will typically have different amounts of general human capital when they start a 
job, while by definition all workers will have zero firm-specific capital when they are hired.  One 
would therefore expect that within a job differences between workers in human capital 
acquisition will be dominated by differences in general training, even for jobs where there are 
large amounts of specific training.  Indeed, in the case where all workers in a job are brought to 
the same level of general and specific human capital by the end of a training period, there will be 
no differences in specific human capital acquisition between workers in the same job.  To 
simplify the discussion below, we assume that specific human capital acquisition does not vary 
among workers in the same job.  We view this assumption as quite reasonable, particularly in 
light of the fact that there is some question whether much human capital acquisition is specific to 
start with. 
Consider a two period model.  Workers￿ starting wages depend upon their starting 
productivity and upon their human capital acquisition: 
(1)       1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ln ln u s g H w s g + + + + = γ γ β α , 
where H1 is the worker￿s stock of general human capital at the start of the match, g ≡ ln G2 ￿ ln 
G1 and s ≡ ln S2 are general and specific human capital acquisition during the first period, and u1 
                                                 
6 Seventy-two percent of employers indicate that nearly all or most of the skills learned are general; eight percent 
indicate that none of the skills are general.  Similarly, workers in the NLSY indicate that most of the skills acquired 
in training are useful at other employers.  9
is a mean zero residual.  In interpreting (1), note that the coefficient β 1 denotes the extent of 
wage compression.  If β 1 = 1, differences in productivity are completely reflected in differences 
in wages once human capital cost sharing is accounted for.  If β 1 < 1, differences in wages are 
compressed relative to differences in productivity.  The coefficients γ 1g and γ 1s are nonnegative 
and reflect the degree to which the employer shares the cost of human capital acquisition.  Cost 
sharing by the employer means that worker is paid a starting wage higher than he otherwise 
would receive.
7  If the worker bears the full cost to general human capital acquisition, then γ1g  = 
0. 
Similarly, wages in period 2 are given by 
(2)      2 2 2 2 2 2 2 ln ln u s g H w s g + γ + γ + β + α = . 
As with equation (1), the coefficient β 2 reflects wage compression.  The coefficients γ 2g 
and γ 2s are nonpositive and reflect the employer sharing the return to general and specific human 
capital accumulation, respectively: if the employer shares the return to human capital 
accumulation, then the worker is paid a wage below what he would otherwise receive.
8  
Estimating (1) and (2) would require measures of productivity in dollar terms and 
decompositions of measured productivity growth into specific and general components, neither 
of which is present in the EOPP data.   Measurement error is also a concern.  In light of these 
considerations, we use a set of instruments to estimate two differenced equations: a wage growth 
                                                 
7 If workers become more productive simply because of learning by doing, then human capital acquisition does not 
entail an explicit cost.  However, as made clear in the model laid out in Section IV, if employers realize part of the 
return to the higher productivity in period 2, a zero profit equilibrium condition implies that workers will be paid a 
first period wage that exceeds their starting marginal product, so that γ1g and γ1s are positive.  
8 Note that the specification in (2) is no less general than the specification 
2 2 2 2
’
2 2 2 2 2 ’ ln ln ln u s g S G w s g + + + + + = γ γ β β α : the two specifications are equivalent if β2+γ 2S = β￿2+ 
γ ￿2S.   Since s = lnS2, the sum β￿2 + γ ￿2S is identified, but not the parameters 
’
2 β  and γ ￿2S.     10
equation that is obtained by subtracting (1) from (2) and a first differenced starting wage 
equation obtained by differencing (1) between two different workers in the same job.
9 
 Differencing the starting wage equation (1) for two workers, A and B, in the same job:  
(3)      ) ( ) ln (ln ln ln 1 1 1 1 1 1
B A
g
B A B A g g H H w w − + − = − γ β  
                                                   ) ( ) ( 1 1 1
B A B A
s u u s s − + − +γ   . 
Consider a regression of 
B A w w 1 1 ln ln −  on predicted differences in the two workers￿ human 
capital: 
(4)      u h c H b w w
B A B A B A + + = −
− − ￿ ￿ ln ln 1 1 1 1  
where ) | ) ln ((ln ￿
1 1 Z H H E H
B A B A − ≡
− ,       
            ) | ) ln (ln ) ln ((ln ￿
1 2 1 2 Z H H H H E h
B B A A B A − − − ≡
−         
                     ) | ) ( ) (( Z s s g g E
B A B A − + − = , 
u is a residual, and Z is a set of instruments.  Under our assumption that  0 ) ( = −
B A s s  for all 
jobs,  ) | ) (( ￿ Z g g E h
B A B A − =
−  and the consistency of 2SLS implies that  1 1 lim β = b p  and 
g c p γ = 1 lim .
10  In Becker’s (1962) classic model of human capital acquisition, there is no wage 
                                                 
9 Due to idiosyncrasies of the data which we discuss below, it is not possible to difference second period wages 
between two workers in the same job. 
10 These results depend on our assumption that workers in the same job acquire the same amount of specific human 
capital.  More generally, project 
B A H
− ￿  on  ) | ) ( ￿ Z g g E g
B A B A − ≡
−  and  ) | ) ( ￿ Z s s E s
B A B A − ≡
− :  
v s d g d d H
B A B A B A + + + =
− − − ￿ ￿ ￿
2 1 0 .   Then one can show that 
) ( ) )) ￿ , ￿ ( ( ) ￿ ( ) ￿ ( ( ) (
) )) ￿ , ￿ ( ( ) ￿ ( ) ￿ ( )( (




1 v Var s g Cov s Var g Var d d
s g Cov s Var g Var d d
b p B A B A B A B A
B A B A B A B A
s g + − −
− −
− + = − − − −
− − − −
γ γ β .  
Also,  s g c p γ ω − + ωγ = ) 1 ( lim 1 , where the weight ω   is determined by the relative covariances of predicted 
general and specific human capital with 
B A H
− ￿  and 
B A h
− ￿ :  
2 )) ￿ , ￿ ( ( ) ￿ ( ) ￿ (
) ￿ , ￿ ( ) ￿ , ￿ ( ) ￿ , ￿ ( ) ￿ (
B A B A B A B A
B A B A B A B A B A B A B A
h H Cov h Var H Var
h H Cov g H Cov h g Cov H Var
− − − −
− − − − − − −
−
−
= ω  
  11
compression and workers bear the full cost and return to general human capital acquisition 
occurring on the job, so that b1 = 1 and c1 = 0.  
Now subtract (1) from (2) to obtain an equation for wage growth between the first and 
second period: 
 (5)      1 1 2 1 2 1 2 ln ) ( ) ( ln ln H w w β − β + α − α = −             
                                    + ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 u u s g s s g g − + γ − γ + β + γ − γ + β . 
Consider a regression of  1 2 ln ln w w − on human capital acquisitionh ￿: 
(6)      ) ( ￿ ln ln 1 2 2 2 1 2 u u h c b w w − + + = − ,                                  
where  ) | ln (ln ￿
1 2 Z H H E h − ≡ .  One can show that   
(7)     ) ( ) ( ) )( 1 ( lim 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 β β ω γ γ ω γ γ ω β − + − + − − + = s s s g g s c p , 
where the weight  ) ￿ ( ) ￿ , ￿ ( h Var h s Cov s ≡ ω  is the contribution of (predicted) specific human capital 
to the overall variance of (predicted) human capital growth and  ) ￿ ( ) ￿ , ￿ ( 2 2 h Var h H Cov ≡ ω .
11   
Note that ω s and ω 2 and therefore c2 will depend on the choice of instruments.
12  This reflects the 
fact that the effect of productivity growth on wage growth varies depending on the relative 
                                                 
11 Analogously to above,  ) | (ln ￿
2 2 Z H E H = .  We have :  
) ￿ (
) ￿ , ￿ ( ) ( ) ￿ , ￿ ( ) ( ) ln , ￿ ( ) (
) ￿ (
) ln ln , ￿ (
lim





s h Cov g h Cov H h Cov
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w w h Cov
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(where we add and subtract β 1 ln H2 from (5) and note that  ) 0 ) ￿ , ( 1 2 = − h u u Cov .  The text 
expression follows by noting that  ). ￿ ( ) ￿ , ￿ ( ) ￿ , ￿ ( h Var s h Cov g h Cov = +  
12 For example, letting  Z s Z g s s g g 1 0 1 0 ￿ , ￿ κ + κ = κ + κ = , and noting that 
, ) ( ) ( ￿ ￿ ￿
1 1 0 0 Z s g h s g s g κ + κ + κ + κ = + = ∆  one can easily see that ω g will be determined by the relative 
magnitudes of κ1g and κ1s: instruments having a stronger relationship with general human capital relative to specific 
capital will weight the general human capital coefficient more heavily.  12
contributions of general and specific human capital to productivity growth.
13  Under the Becker 
model, with β1 = β2 = 1 and  , 0 1 2 = γ = γ g g  the coefficient c2 will converge to 1 + ω s(γs2 - γs1), so 
the deviation of c2 from 1 will depend on the extent to which the employer shares the return to 
specific capital and (predicted) specific capital’s overall contribution to the variance of 
(predicted) human  capital growth.  A low value of c2 can be taken as evidence against the Becker 
model if it implies an implausibly high contribution of specific capital to overall productivity 
growth.  Note that c2 can differ from 1 for two possible reasons: (a) because the employer shares 
the returns to human capital acquisition, either through wage compression or through direct 
sharing of costs and return (as picked up in the first three terms of (7)) and (b) because the extent 
of wage compression changes over time.     
III. Empirical Results 
The wage equations that we estimate are dictated by the workers for whom we have wage 
and productivity information.  In section II we provided interpretations for wage growth 
regressions and for regressions of differences in starting wages on differences in productivity for 
workers in the same job.  Ideally, we would estimate a wage growth equation for the last worker 
hired or the typical worker, and we would estimate a separate equation for the difference 
between the starting wage of the last worker hired and the typical worker.  However, we know 
the typical worker￿s wage after two years, but not at the start of the job.  And while we know the 
starting wage paid to the last worker hired, we do not have useful information on the wage this 
worker received subsequently.
14  Consequently, we estimate a pseudo-wage-growth equation, in 
                                                 
13 Angrist and Imbens (1996), Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1995), and other papers in the literature on local average 
treatment effects analyze the properties of IV when the effect of the regressor of interest varies across the population, 
and similarly find that the limit of the IV estimator will depend on the choice of  instruments. 
14 Employers are asked about the wage received by the last worker hired at the time of the interview, but this 
worker￿s tenure is typically quite short.  For example, the last worker hired has been on the job less than one year in  13
which the dependent variable is  ) ln( ) ln( 0 104 w w
typ − , where 
typ w104 denotes the typical worker￿s wage 
after 104 weeks and w0 denotes the starting wage paid to the last worker hired. 
Letting 
typ w0  denote the typical worker￿s log starting wage, one can write 
(8)       )) ln( ) (ln( )) ln( ) (ln( ) ln( ) ln( 0 0 0 104 0 104 w w w w w w
typ typ typ typ − + − = −  
The first term on the right hand side of (8) is simply the growth rate in the wage of the typical 
worker during the first two years of employment.  The growth rate in the typical worker￿s wage 
depends on the growth in this worker￿s productivity, or 
(6￿)     2 2 2 2 0 104 ) ln( ) ln( ε + + = − X l h c w w
typ typ typ , 
where  ) ln( ) ln( 0 104
typ typ typ H H h − ≡  denotes the difference in logarithms between the typical 
worker￿s productivity after two years and when he is initially hired, and ε 2 is an error term with 
mean 0.  The X2 term denotes a vector of variables, described below, that influence wage growth 
independently of productivity, possibly due to contracting considerations.  The second term on 
the right hand side of (8), the difference between the log starting wage of the typical worker and 
of the last worker hired, depends on these workers￿ marginal products at the time of hire, or 
 (4￿)      1 1 1 1 1 0 0 ) ln( ) ln( ε + + ∆ + ∆ = − X l h c H b w w
typ ,            
where  ) ln( ) ln( 0 0 H H H
typ − ≡ ∆  is the difference between the log starting productivity of the 
typical worker and the last worker hired,  )) ln( ) (ln( )) ln( ) (ln( 0 104 0 104 H H H H h
typ typ − − − ≡ ∆  is the 
difference between the productivity growth rate of the typical worker and of the last worker, X1 
denotes variables other than productivity that affect starting wage differences,  and ε 1 is a mean 
zero error term      
Substituting (6￿) and (4￿) into (8) yields  
                                                                                                                                                            
over 50 percent of the sample observations.  We will subsequently use this information to estimate the length of time 
until the first wage adjustment.      14
(9)      h c H b h c w w
typ typ ∆ + ∆ + = − 1 1 2 0 104 ) ln( ) ln( . 2 1 2 2 1 1 ε ε + + + + X l X l  
OLS Estimation 
For comparison purposes, we begin by estimating an OLS version of (9).
15  We do not 
have a direct report on the productivity of the last worker after two years and therefore are not 
able to include the variable ∆h to obtain an estimate of c1.  (We include predicted values of ∆h in 
our subsequent analysis.)  The control vector X2 includes a constant, union indicator, the log of 
the number of employees at the firm, and tenure.
16   Ideally, X1 would contain differences in 
characteristics between the typical worker in the job and the last worker hired.  However, the 
survey does not contain information on the characteristics of the typical worker.  These 
characteristics are accordingly imputed by using predicted values from regressions of the 
characteristics of the last worker hired on the X2 variables plus a vector Ztyp of characteristics of 
the typical worker or the job that affect productivity but do not otherwise affect wages.
17  Each 
variable in X1  is calculated as the difference between the actual characteristic of the last worker 
hired and the imputed value.  The vector X1 includes the following variables: age, age squared, 
dummies for years of schooling of 16 or more and greater than 12 but less than 16, and dummies 
for prior vocational training, female, part-time (less than thirty-five hours a week), and 
temporary/seasonal job.  
As reported in the top panel of Table 2, the estimated coefficient on productivity growth 
is only 0.035, which, although statistically significant from zero, is very small by any standard.   
The estimated coefficient on the difference in log productivity, reported in the first column of 
                                                 
15 Productivity at time 0 equals 0 for a few of the observations.  We therefore add a small number (.1) to time 0 
productivity and time two year productivity before taking logs.  Our results are not sensitive to the choice of number; 
the results are also not affected if one simply drops the observations where time 0 productivity is zero.     
16 Employers are (implicitly) asked about the starting wage paid to the most recently hired worker at the time he was 
hired.  Since wages increase over time, greater tenure is associated with a lower starting wage and higher wage 
growth.   
17 The vector Ztyp is described below.  15
Table 2, is only 0.023.  This is similar to the coefficient on initial productivity of 0.055 found by 
Bishop (1987) using a sub-sample with observations of two workers in the same job. 
The implicit hypothesis in using productivity at the very start of the job as our starting 
productivity measure is that at any instant workers are paid on the basis of their marginal product 
at that point in time.  This is something of a straw man because wages are not adjusted 
continuously over time, but instead are fixed for discrete intervals.  Indeed, as discussed above, 
the descriptive statistics reported in Table 1 indicate that productivity growth is particularly high 
at the very beginning of employment.  It seems likely that expected productivity beyond the first 
two weeks is folded into the starting wage.   
The second column of Table 2 reports estimates using average productivity over the first 
three months on the job as our starting productivity measure, which we calculate as a weighted 
average of the productivity during the first two weeks and the productivity from the third week to 
the twelfth week: 12 , 3 2 , 0 12 , 0 ) 6 / 5 ( ) 6 / 1 ( H H H + = , where  ’ ,t t H  is average productivity between 
weeks t and t￿.  The coefficient on productivity growth increases to 0.073, still quite small, while 
that on the difference in starting productivity is unchanged.   
Instrumental Variables Analysis 
We now turn to instrumental variable (IV) estimation.  IV has two advantages here: it 
corrects for measurement error in productivity, a likely reason for the small estimated 
coefficients using OLS, and it gives us a measure for predicted  . h ∆  to allow estimation of (9). 
As noted by Bishop (1987), the EOPP productivity estimates likely contain considerable 
measurement error.  Prima facie evidence for this is provided by the fact that the productivity 
reports are predominantly round numbers.  For example, about 95% of the 1,502 observations for 
the productivity of the last worker hired in the first two weeks are divisible by 5, and about 5%  16
of the observations are exactly 50.  Measurement error typically implies that OLS estimates are 
biased downward.  However, one might well argue that the standard result does not apply to the 
present case because the wage offered by an employer should depend directly on the employer￿s 
imperfect estimate of worker productivity, and not on the worker￿s unobserved ￿true￿ 
productivity. 
There are two possible explanations why the employer￿s wage offer might depend on 
something other than the employer￿s reported productivity estimate.  First, the employer might 
recognize that his initial estimate of the worker￿s productivity, H, is fraught with error, and refine 
it by combining it with the average productivity of workers with similar characteristics to obtain 
an improved estimate, H
~
, on which pay is based.  To the extent that the employer reports H 
rather than  H
~
 to the EOPP survey, the estimated OLS effect of productivity on wages will be 
biased downward.   
The alternative explanation is ￿Friedmanesque￿ in nature: employers may simply be 
acting as if they are making wage offers based on their assessments of worker productivity.  
Rather than consciously forming productivity estimates, employers may be basing their wage 
offers on workers￿ observed characteristics, and presumably being driven to the optimal wage 
offers over time.  In this scenario, employers only explicitly obtain an actual measure of worker 
productivity when they are asked to do so by the survey.  Again, the estimated OLS effect of 
productivity on wages will be biased downward.   
We adopt a two stage least squares procedure.  In the first stage, we estimate a 
productivity equation, which is then subsequently used to predict h
typ,  H ∆ , and  h ∆  in (9).  Our 
productivity equation estimates the path that productivity follows over time.  Thus, besides 
eliminating the possible downward bias from measurement error, our IV analysis also enables us  17
to examine the effect of allowing the length of time until the first wage adjustment--hereafter 
referred to as "contract length"--to vary.  For the time being, we continue to assume that the 
wage is initially set for a period of twelve weeks.   
Employers in the survey are asked about the productivity of the last worker hired at the 
time of the interview and the typical worker who has been in the position for two years.  This 
allows us to estimate the following productivity equation 
(10)      1 1 1 1 1 2 1 104 ) ’ ( ) / ln( τ χ + χ + ψ + χ + χ + δ + ψ = Z Z X Z Z X X p p typ typ typ typ
typ
t  
                                   t typ typ v m Z Z X + + τ χ + χ + ψ + 2 2 2 1 2 ) ’ ( , 
where we adopt the spline specification τ1=min(ln(t+1),ln(12+1)) and τ2 = max(ln(t+1)-ln(12+1), 
0), tenure t is measured in weeks, and where we have normalized by dividing the last worker￿s 
productivity by the productivity of the typical worker after two years.  The vector Ztyp includes 
the logarithm of the number of hours the typical new employee in the position spends watching 
other people do the job, the logarithm of the number of hours of formal training provided to the 
typical worker, the logarithm of the number of hours of informal training provided to the typical 
worker, and the logarithm of the number of weeks it takes a new employee in the most recently 
filled position to become fully qualified.  The vector Z contains the log of the most recently hired 
worker￿s formal training, the log of the most recently hired worker￿s informal training, and the 
log of the most recently hired worker￿s relevant experience; the vector Z’ excludes the log of 
relevant experience from Z.  The residual consists of m, which is a mean-zero person-specific 
fixed effect, and vt, which is iid measurement error.  The error structure is important in allowing 
us to derive a closed-form expression for expected log productivity growth, as the fixed effect  18
factors out.
18  This error structure implies that the variance of the regression error is invariant 
with respect to tenure, as is the covariance between residuals for the same worker at different 
tenures.  Neither implication is rejected by the data.
19  
From (10), the most recently hired worker￿s true productivity during the first twelve 
weeks is equal to 
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Note that the productivity of the typical worker during the first 12 weeks can be obtained by 
substituting the typical worker￿s training and experience for that of the last worker hired.  
Specifically,  
           (12)      ) 0 , 12 , , , ( ) exp(
’ ’ ’
104 12 , 0 typ typ typ
typ typ Z Z Z J m p p = , 
                                                 
18 One can show that interacting imputed variables with the tenure spline leads to an error structure that is 
heteroscedastic with respect to tenure so that there is no closed form solution for predicted productivity growth 
(equation (13) below). This is why X2  and the log of relevant experience are not interacted with the tenure splines.  
The p value of the interaction of these variables with the tenure spline variables is .25. 
19 The variance of the regression error in starting productivity during the first two weeks is significantly larger than 
the variance of the regression error for all subsequent points in time, but the first two weeks constitute a sufficiently 
small fraction of the first period that the fixed-effect is still a good approximation.  Regressing the squared residual 
on tenure and tenure squared beyond the first two weeks yields a p value of .59.  Interacting the residual for starting 
productivity with the residual for productivity from the third to the twelfth week and regressing on tenure and tenure 
squared yields a p value of .39; interacting the residual for starting productivity with the residual for productivity 
after the twelfth week and regressing on tenure and tenure squared yields a p value of .93; interacting the residual for 
the residual for productivity from the third to the twelfth week with the residual for productivity after the twelfth 
week and regressing on tenure and tenure squared yields a p value of .83.     19
where
’
typ Z  denotes the vector obtained when one replaces the elements of Z￿ with the 
corresponding elements of Ztyp and 
’ ’
typ Z  denotes the vector obtained by replacing the elements of 
Z with the corresponding elements of Ztyp and the relevant experience of the typical worker.  
From (12), the predicted log productivity growth of the typical worker is given by  
(13)      )) 0 , 12 , , , ( ln( ) , , , , | ) ln( ) (ln(
’ ’ ’ ’ ’
typ
’
typ 2 1 12 , 0 104 typ typ typ typ
typ typ Z Z Z J Z Z Z X X p p E − = − . 
One can similarly predict  ) ln( ) ln( 12 , 0 12 , 0 p p
typ − , the difference between the log productivity of the 
most recently hired worker and the typical worker during the first twelve weeks, and 
)) ln( ) (ln( )) ln( ) (ln( 12 , 0 104 12 , 0 104
t typ typ p p p p − − − , the difference in log productivity growth 
Selected coefficients in the estimated productivity equation can be found in Table 3.
20  
The coefficients conform to one￿s expectations.  The greater the last hire￿s relevant experience in 
jobs having some application to his current position, the greater is the initial productivity of the 
last hire relative to the productivity of the typical worker who has been in the job two years.  In 
contrast, the length of time it takes the typical worker with no experience to become fully trained 
and qualified, the number of hours the typical worker spends in training activities watching other 
people do the job, and the training the last worker hired receives all reduce the initial 
productivity of the last hire relative to the productivity of the typical worker who has been in the 
job two years.  These variables also raise the rate at which the relative productivity of the last 
worker hired rises over time.
21  The latter effect is much stronger during the first three months 
than subsequently.      
                                                 
20 Note that we have up to three observations per worker--an observation from between 0 and 2 weeks, from 3 to 12 
weeks, and productivity at the time of the interview. 
21 Relevant experience and the length of time until qualified are ideal instruments in that they should only affect 
wages indirectly through their effect on productivity.  However, aside from its effect on productivity, training may 
entail costs that also affect wages.  We would expect this effect to be relatively small compared to the productivity 
effect.  But in any case, given the positive correlation between training and productivity growth and the negative  20
Table 4 shows IV estimates of the wage equation.  As indicated in the first row of Table 4, 
the IV estimate of b1 is equal to .32.  While significantly different from zero, it is also 
substantially and significantly below one.  Recall that the difference between one and this 
coefficient indicates the degree of wage compression for starting wages, so we have evidence of 
substantial wage compression.  The estimate of c1 is only equal to .19.   Recall that c1 indicates 
the degree of employer sharing of the costs of general human capital acquisition, so there is little 
evidence of sharing.  However, this coefficient is imprecisely estimated, so one cannot rule out 
substantial sharing.  The IV estimate of c2 is 0.22, indicating that wage growth is substantially 
less than productivity growth.    
The preceding sharing rule estimates assume that productivity over the first twelve weeks 
is folded into the starting wage.  It is straightforward to modify the analysis to reflect alternative 
assumptions about contract length.
22  Rows 2- 5 of Table 4 show estimates of the productivity 
coefficients for other values of τ.  The b1 coefficient is quite stable, showing that the evidence for 
wage compression is not an artifact of a particular assumed contract length..  The c1 and c2 
coefficients are more volatile, with c1 decreasing (and even becoming negative) and c2 increasing 
with contract length.  
One obvious objection to the previous estimates is that contract lengths need not be 
constant across workers.  Fortunately, one can estimate contract length from the data in the 
                                                                                                                                                            
correlation between training and starting productivity, this will cause one to overestimate both the effect of 
productivity growth on wage growth and the effect of starting productivity on starting wages.   
22 If wages are initially set for a period of length τ ≥ 12, then starting productivity over the initial contact period is 
given by  12 , 12 , 0 , 0
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Similarly, one can obtain expressions for the predicted difference between the log productivity of the most recently 
hired worker and the typical worker during the first τ weeks and for the predicted difference in log productivity 
growth.  21
survey since EOPP provides information on the last-hired worker￿s wage at the time of the 
interview.  We assume that the probability that a worker with a specified amount of tenure, t, has 
already experienced a wage change is given by 
(14)      ) ( ) Pr( 0 t t F w w ξ = ≠ , 
where the function F(•) is the cumulative standard normal distribution and where the vector  t ξ  
includes the variables tenure, tenure squared, a dummy variable equal to 1 if tenure exceeds one 
year, predicted productivity growth after the initial twelve week period 




typ 2 1 12 , 0 104 Z Z Z X X p p E typ
typ − ), and tenure interacted with predicted productivity 
growth.  Productivity growth is included in the probit wage change equation because it seems 
likely that the faster productivity grows, the shorter will be the length of the period for which the 
wage is fixed.
23   
All of the productivity variables in (9) are functions of the contract length τ.  Integrating 
across possible contract lengths using the parameter estimates in (10) and (14), a worker￿s 
expected wage growth is given by  
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In practice, we assume that the initial wage is not set for a period longer than 104 weeks or 
shorter than 12 weeks and amass the probability weights in the tails at the truncation points.
24  
                                                 
23 Our estimation results are not sensitive to the choice of τ. 
 
24 The estimated probit parameters imply that on average the probability that the wage is initially set for a period of 
time that is less than or equal to 12 weeks is .41.  Since the productivity growth coefficient is positively related to  22
The probit estimation results are reported in Table 5 and the resulting estimates of b1, c1, 
and c2 are reported in the last row of Table 4.  The probit results indicate that at least in this data 
set, wages are initially set for a relatively short period of time: for the average worker, mean 
contract length is only 18 weeks.
25  The wage change probit also provides support for the 
hypothesis that the probability of wage changes varies with expected productivity--a joint test 
rejects the hypothesis of no effect of the productivity coefficients at the 1 percent level.  For 
employees with the mean level of productivity growth, the predicted probability of a wage 
change by 18 weeks is 50 percent, while for employees with productivity growth one standard 
deviation above the mean the corresponding probability is 55 percent. 
As reported in the last row of Table 4, the resulting estimate of  b1 is .32 and the estimate 
of c2 is .26.  Both estimates are significantly different from one.  The estimate of c1 is only .17, 
but is very imprecise.  Thus, the data provide strong evidence of wage compression, but do not 
allow us to say much about the degree of cost sharing in the form of a positive relationship 
between the starting wage and productivity growth.  Interestingly, when productivity growth is 
zero, the estimated two year wage growth of the average worker in the average job is 6 percent.  
This may reflect the fact that the employer￿s productivity estimate does not incorporate all costs 
                                                                                                                                                            
tenure for low values of tenure, truncating the contract length distribution at 12 weeks raises the estimated 
coefficient on productivity growth.  The estimated probability that the wage is initially set for a period in excess of 
two years is .13.  The results in Table 4 imply that truncating the contract length distribution at 104 weeks has little 
effect on the estimated productivity growth coefficient.  
25 One possible objection to this analysis is that the data are from the early 1980s, at the end of a period of high 
inflation.  Many of the raises for low values of tenure may have been cost-of-living adjustments unrelated to 
productivity.  We tested for this by estimating a non-linear regression of real wage changes from the start of the job 
to the interview date on productivity changes weighted by the probability of a true, non-cost-of-living raise 
(estimated as part of the regression).  Our point estimates indicate that all raises were true, productivity-related raises.  
Specifically, we assumed a wage equation of the form 
η τ τ σ µ ϕ τ τ
τ
+ − + = − ∫ d p p c k w wtt )) ln( ) (ln( ) , , ( ) ln( ) ln( , 0 52 ,
12
0 , where φ(￿,σ,τ) is a normal density function 
indicating the probability of a true wage increase at τ ,  ) ln( 52 , τ p  is the log of average productivity from time τ until 
52 weeks,  and  ) ln( , 0 τ p  is the log of average productivity from time 0 until τ weeks.  Our point estimates of ￿ and σ 
are 13 and .7 if we use the entire sample and 13 and .9 if we restrict the sample to those who have a positive wage 
change), again indicating that that contract length is typically quite short.  23
associated with searching for, hiring, and training new workers.
 26  As in Salop and Salop (1976), 
these costs may be factored into the starting wage (instead of being spread out into future 
wages).     
What is the source of identification for the b1 coefficient?  To answer this question, we 
regress  ∫
∞
ξ ξ ξ − ξ ≡ ∆
0
0 0 ) ) ( )) ( ￿ ln( )) ( ￿ ((ln( t t t t
typ d f H H H  on the other variables in (9) to generate 
residuals capturing the identifying variation in ∆H.  Regressing these residuals on the omitted 
instruments other than the log of relevant experience yields an R
2 of .068.  Adding the log of 
relevant experience to this regression raises the R
2 to .793, indicating that the identifying 
variation in predicted ∆H is predominantly variation in relevant experience.
 27 
Recent theoretical work by Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) and Booth and Zoega (2004) 
has suggested that wage compression may make training more likely, arguing that employers are 
more willing to finance training if the returns to training accrue at least partially to the employer 
due to wages only partly responding to increases in productivity.  Empirical analysis of this 
effect has been hampered by the lack information on productivity.
28  To investigate this issue we 
divided the sample by hours of training for the typical worker and reestimated the variable 
contract length model.  The estimates of b1 show little difference between the subsamples.  
Estimated c2 is 0.13 for the sample with training above the sample median and 0.32 for the low-
training subsample, but the estimates are not significantly different from each other (t=1.22). 
 
 
                                                 
26 One issue with interpreting this result is that it could at least partially be an artifact of functional form, as we 
assume a linear relationship between log productivity growth and log wage growth and  only a few observations 
have zero or near-zero productivity growth.  Further investigation of this question is outside the scope of this paper.  
27 The remaining unexplained variation is accounted for by the non-linear construction of the variable. 
28 Empirical studies include Brunello (2002), Almeida-Santos and Mumford (2004), Ericson (2004), and Peraita 
(2001).  The findings are mixed.  24
IV.  A Simple Sharing Model with Equity Norms 
The foregoing results imply that predictable differences in employees’ starting 
productivity based on their relevant job experience are not completely reflected in wages.  This is 
contrary to traditional theory, which suggests that any rents earned by firms by paying 
experienced hires less than their productivity would be bid away by competing employers.   
While one can find explanations of wage compression in the literature, these seem for the 
most part unsatisfactory in the present context.  Frank (1984) proposes a model where more 
productive workers derive utility from their status within the firm and are willing to accept a 
wage less than their marginal product in order to work side by side with workers who are paid 
less.  However, it seems unlikely that workers who are more productive simply because they are 
more experienced would derive utility from this fact.  Similarly, Akerlof and Yellen (1990) posit 
that large wage differentials between groups may be perceived as unfair and lead to reduced 
effort.  However, since less-experienced workers will acquire experience (barring layoffs) it is 
not clear why they would feel aggrieved by steep wage-experience profiles. Explanations based 
on asymmetric information, as in Acemoglu and Pischke (1998,1999), Katz and Ziderman 
(1999), and Chang and Wang (1996) fail to account for the fact that predicted productivity as a 
function of relevant experience--a variable which is publicly observable--is not rewarded 
proportionately.   
As discussed by Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) and Zoega and Booth (2005), monopsony 
power by employers can lead to wage compression if search is more costly for higher skilled 
workers.  However, this seems unlikely by itself to explain the magnitude of starting wage 
compression that we observe in the data.  In fact, if one allows entry, the monopsony model does 
not unambiguously predict compression in the starting wage.  There are two competing effects.   25
A more highly skilled worker for whom search is more costly will be in a weaker bargaining 
position than a less skilled worker with lower search costs.  But knowing that he will be 
relatively immobile once he accepts the employer￿s job and thus subject to higher rent extraction 
by the employer in the future, the more highly skilled worker will bargain for a higher proportion 
of his compensation up front.  If the second effect dominates the first, starting wages will vary 
more than proportionately with productivity.    
Here we suggest an explanation based on the interaction of equity considerations such as 
those in Akerlof and Yellen (1990) with employer sharing of the cost of human capital 
acquisition.  If employers share the costs of human capital investment, they recoup these costs by 
paying employees trained by the firm less than their marginal product.  Hiring trained outsiders 
at a wage equal to their marginal product implies that observationally equivalent workers are 
paid different wages.  It is easy to imagine that an employer￿s senior workers will be unhappy 
and put forth less effort if they receive a lower wage than other experienced workers who are no 
more productive, but who simply began their careers at other firms.  Such behavior seems 
consistent with both casual observation of the labor market and experimental studies cited in 
Akerlof and Yellen (1990).
 29  We show that an ￿equity norm￿ will not only lead to wage 
compression, but also will amplify employer sharing of the return to general human capital 
acquisition, as the wage compression and sharing effects will reinforce each other.         
Our model is similar to that developed by Hashimoto (1981) to analyze the optimal 
division of the returns and costs to firm-specific human capital investment.  Unlike Hashimoto 
(1981), we assume that human capital is purely general in that its expected value is the same 
                                                 
29 In their experimental study, Charness and Kuhn (2005) find little response of effort to co-worker wages, but 
explicitly do not consider the case where workers know that they are identically productive.  In our analysis, this 
would not be a ￿knife-edge￿ case since employers paying senior workers less than newly hired experienced workers 
would be differentiating on the basis of a characteristic that is known to be unrelated to productivity.    26
everywhere.  Consider a match between an employer and an employee who is in the labor market 
for two periods.  The worker is hired in period 1 and has a starting value of marginal product of 
H.  As a result of on-the-job training and learning by doing, the worker￿s expected productivity is 
higher in period 2.  The worker’s actual period 2 productivity is random and is not observed until 
the start of that period.  Letting h denote the value in period 2 of the human capital accumulated 
in the initial period and η  denote the value of the productivity shock, the worker￿s actual value of 
marginal product in period 2 is H + h + η . 
The worker￿s utility in each period is equal to the wage he receives plus the amenity 
value ε   he places on the employer￿s job. The worker observes ε  after he starts the job. The 
worker receives a starting wage equal to w1 and a second period wage of w2.  If the worker 
moves to a new job, he incurs the moving cost c = c(H + h).  Assuming that the worker￿s human 
capital is general, he receives the alternative wage H + h.   
We assume that the cost of locating and moving to a new job increases with the worker￿s 
stock of human capital.  More senior positions at an employer are typically filled from within by 
workers who have proved to be a good match.  Consequently, a worker with more experience 
and training searching for a job typically has a smaller set of openings available to him and will 
generally find it more difficult and costly to find and relocate to an employer who can use his 
skills effectively.
30     
                                                 
30 This motivation differs from that in Acemoglu and Pischke (1999), who argue that locating another job requires a 
period of unemployment, which is more costly to higher paid workers.   Zoega and Booth￿s  (2005) model of wage 
compression assumes that the set of employers who can use more able, higher skilled workers is smaller than the set 
of employers who can use less skilled workers.  This is more similar to our motivation except that Zoega and 
Booth￿s argument is applicable when one is comparing workers in high- and low- skilled occupations.  In contrast, 
we are comparing workers who are in the same basic occupation.  27
Because the value of η  is the private information of the employer and the value of ε  is the 
private information of the worker, we assume, like Hashimoto, that the two parties cannot 
contract on the basis of the realized values of η  and ε .
31  Letting  
(16)     D = H + h - w2 
denote the rent the employer extracts when η  is zero, the employer dismisses the worker if η   <  
- D.  It pays for the worker to quit when ε   < ε












ε ε ) ( , where g(⋅ ) and f(⋅ ) 
denote the density functions of η  and ε .    
The expected gain to the worker from his match with the employer is given by 
) )( ) 1 (( ) | ( ) 1 )( 1 (( 2 1 c h H L Q L w E Q L w U
c − + + − + ≥ + − − + = ε ε ε δ , where δ  denotes the 
discount factor.  The worker is willing to form a match with the employer if U is at least as great 
as the expected utility U
A available to experienced workers elsewhere in the labor market.  The 
employer￿s expected gain from his match with the worker is π   =  H - w1 + δ (1-L)(1-Q)E(D+η| η 
≥  -D) . 
The employer chooses first and second period wages to maximize π   subject to the 
constraint that U  ≥  U
A.  Note that the first period wage simply serves to divide up the total return 
to the match between the employer and worker.  In a competitive labor market, the first period 
wage is bid up until the employer￿s expected profit over the two periods is driven to zero, or 
(17)    w1 =  H + δ (1-L)(1-Q) E(D+η| η ≥ -D) .  
                                                 
31 Mortensen (1978) shows that inefficient separations can be eliminated if the employee and employer post turnover 
bonds that provide compensation for losses imposed by the other’s decision to separate.  While one occasionally 
observes turnover bonds, as noted by Black and Loewenstein (1998), their general use is limited by the fact that they 
are hard to implement when the exact value of the match to one party is not known by the other party.  In addition, 
as noted by Carmichael (1983), turnover bonds suffer from the disadvantage of providing the worker and employer 
with an incentive to induce the other party to initiate turnover.   28
When the employer decides whether or not to dismiss a worker, he does not take into account the 
potential loss that the dismissal imposes on the worker.  Similarly, when the worker decides 
whether to quit, he does not take into account the potential loss that a quit imposes on the 
employer.  The optimal second period wage, or, equivalently, the optimal D, minimizes the 
expected loss from inefficient separations.  Differentiating and rearranging terms one finds that 
at the optimum  
(18)      ε ε ε ε η η η ε
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or equivalently, (∂ Q/∂ D)(1-L)E(η +D|η >-D) = -(∂ L/∂ D)(1-Q)E(ε -ε
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c): the reduction in the 
worker￿s expected capital loss from a marginal increase in D must just equal the increase in the 
employer￿s expected capital loss.
32   
Let D
0 denote the optimal value of D.  Differentiating (17) with respect to h, one finds 
that 
(19)      ) ( ’ /
0 h H Mc h D + = ∂ ∂ ,    
 where 0 < M < 1.
33  So if greater human capital accumulation is associated with higher mobility 
costs, the employer will share part of the return with the worker.  Differentiating (17) yields 
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of the quit rate and of the dismissal rate does not decrease too much as the wage rate increases.  Henceforth we 
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the higher rent earned by the employer in the second period is paid to the worker in the form of a 
higher first period wage (generating a positive value for the coefficient γ 1g in equation (1) above, 
unlike the Becker model).  Finally, differentiating (17) with respect to H yields  
(21)      1 ) )) ( ( )( 1 )( ( ) 1 ( ( ’ ) ’ 1 ( 1 /
0
0
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c d g D M f Q M c H w . 
The increase in mobility costs from the higher H leads to rent extraction in the second period, 
which is compensated for by a higher wage in the first period.  Thus the variation in the starting 
wage exceeds the variation in starting productivity, contrary to our empirical results.  Note that 
we have assumed that an employer hiring a new worker does not have any monopsony power, so 
that the newly hired worker￿s expected lifetime compensation equals his expected lifetime value 
of marginal product.  As mentioned above, allowing monopsony power breaks this equality, with 
the result that there is no clear prediction as to whether variation in the starting wage exceeds or 
is less than variation in starting productivity.  
Equity Norms 
We now posit the existence of an ￿equity norm￿ that prevents an employer from paying 
retained workers less than equally productive experienced workers hired from the outside.  Such 
a norm implies that a worker who moves to a new employer in period 2 will realize a smaller 
return to his initial general human capital investment and will be less likely to quit.  Specifically, 
letting the wage the worker can receive at an alternative employer be given by H + h - D
A, the 
minimum value of ε  such that the worker does not quit is now given by ε
c = D - D
A - c.   
Other than the changed definition ε
c, condition (18) is unchanged.  This condition 
implicitly defines D as a function of D
A: D = χ (D
A).  Differentiating D with respect to D
A, one  30
finds that M = ’ χ : a reduction in the alternative wage causes a partial reduction in the second 
period wage offered by a worker￿s initial employer.   
Competition for experienced workers will ensure that they do not receive less than 
retained workers.  Thus, if all employers hire a mix of inexperienced and experienced workers, 
labor market equilibrium requires that D = D
A.  Note that when D = D
A, ε
c = - c.  The equity 
norm equilibrium conditions therefore reduce to  
(22)      ε ε ε η η η d f c D g d g D c f
c D
c





+ − = + − . 
Let D
* denote the equilibrium value of D.  It follows immediately that D
* < D
0 . 
Unlike the case without equity constraints, and consistent with our empirical results, the 
equity norm implies that the variation in starting productivity will generally exceed the variation 
in the starting wage.  For example, suppose that starting differences in the stock of human capital 
are fully offset by differences in human capital accumulation during the first period of 
employment and let H  denote the stock of human capital achieved by all workers in the second 
period.  Then a new worker will not receive compensation for any starting human capital that 
exceeds  * D H − . 
The existence of an equity norm also affects the extent to which employers share in the 
return to human capital accumulation.  Specifically, differentiating (22), one finds after a little 
algebra that 
(23)      ) 1 /( ) ( ’ /
* M h Mc h D − = ∂ ∂ . 
Comparing (23) and (19), one sees that that the existence of an equity norm amplifies the  initial 
tendency by employers to share in the costs and returns to general human capital investment.  In  31
terms of our empirical model, this implies a reduction in c2 and an increase in c1.   While c1 is not 
precisely estimated, our model is consistent with low values of b1 and c2.  
In deriving the equity-norm equilibrium, we have assumed that employers hire a mix of 
inexperienced and experienced workers.  This will be the case if inexperienced and experienced 
workers are strong complements in production, something which seems consistent with casual 
observation.  For example, it may be efficient to place less skilled, inexperienced workers in less 
demanding tasks and let experienced workers concentrate on certain critical tasks for which they 
are better suited.  Or part of experienced workers￿ higher value may stem from the informal 
training that they provide to less experienced workers.
34 
V. Conclusion 
Exploiting the richness of the EOPP data, this paper has analyzed the relationship 
between wages and productivity during the early years of an employment relationship.  The 
EOPP data show that worker productivity grows substantially during the early part of the 
employment relationship: productivity after two years is on average eighty percent higher than at 
the start of the job.  The data also indicate that most of the growth in productivity occurs at the 
very start of the job, with sixty-four percent of the growth in two year productivity occurring 
during the first three months.   
Even when one corrects for measurement error and the fact that expected productivity 
beyond the start of the job may be folded into the starting wage if wage revisions are not 
instantaneous, one finds that variation in productivity is only partially reflected in wages.  One 
observes this along two dimensions.  First, there is compression in the starting wage.   Starting 
productivity differences for workers in the same job ￿ in large part driven by differences in 
                                                 
34  In their formally similar model, Akerlof and Yellen (1990) consider equilibria with segregation of different types 
of workers; detailed analysis of these equilibria in the present case is outside the scope of this paper.   32
relevant experience - are only partially reflected in starting wage differences even when one 
controls for differences in human capital acquisition.  Second, productivity growth stemming 
from human capital accumulation while on the job is only partially reflected in wage growth, 
reflecting employer sharing of the costs and returns to human capital acquisitions and/or 
increased wage compression over time. 
Our empirical findings can be explained by adding equity norms to a simple model of 
employer sharing of the costs of human capital.  Our model has two key features.  First, similar 
to Zoega and Booth (2005), the cost of locating and moving to a new job increases with the 
worker￿s stock of human capital, reflecting the fact that more highly skilled workers typically 
have a smaller set of potential employers to choose from.  Second (and to our knowledge unique 
to our model), in offering wages to new workers, an employer is constrained by the fact that his 
senior workers will be unhappy and uncooperative if they receive a lower wage than other 
workers who are no more productive.  In equilibrium, there can be substantial wage compression: 
higher productivity resulting from the acquisition of human capital is only partially reflected in 
wages, whether the human capital accumulation occurs on the current job or at other jobs.   
Similar to Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) and Zoega and Booth (2005), a key feature of 
our model is the association of wage compression with employers’ sharing the cost of human 
capital acquisition.  Our estimate of the sharing effect is right signed, but the data are 
unfortunately insufficient to estimate the sharing effect precisely.  Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) 
and Booth and Zoega (2004) suggest that compression may be associated with willingness of 
firms to train workers.  Unfortunately, the data do not allow precise estimation of the difference 
in wage compression between low- and high-training firms.  Thus, while the presence of wage 
compression receives strong support in our data, we have little to say empirically about the  33
implications of this finding.  Further empirical analysis is required to test models associating 
wage compression with employer cost sharing or employer provision of training.  This analysis 
is made difficult by the paucity of data sets with information on productivity.   34
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Variable Mean Std.  Dev. Min  Max
   
Ln Prod. Growth over  initial 2 years  0.80 1.14 -1.10  6.91
Ln Prod. Growth over initial 3 months  0.51 0.94 -1.37  6.69
Ln Prod. Growth from third month until 
end of second year 
0.29 0.43 -1.25 6.22
Ln Wage Growth  0.18 0.20 -1.99  1.95
Age 27.00 9.08 16.00  64.00
Vocational schooling   0.28 0.45 0.00  1.00
Temporary or seasonal job  0.15 0.35 0.00  1.00
Part-time job  0.21 0.41 0.00  1.00
Union 0.11 0.28 0.00  1.00
Ln establishment size  2.91 1.51 0.00  8.60
Female   0.45 0.50 0.00  1.00
Tenure (weeks)  67.38 71.55 1.10  1152.67
High School Indicator  0.76 0.42 0  1
College indicator  0.12 0.32 0  1
Ln (formal tr. hours+ 1)   0.48 1.30 0.00  6.46
Ln (informal tr. hours + 1)   3.43 1.52 0.00  7.60
Ln (hours watch others, typical, + 1)  2.75 1.73 0.00  6.88
Ln (weeks until fully trained,typical, + 1)  2.21 1.23 0.00  6.03
Ln (weeks rel. experience + 1)  2.86 2.44 0.00  7.64
Ln (formal tr. , typical + 1)   0.50 1.34 0  6.69
Ln (informal tr. , typical, + 1)   3.56 1.48 0  7.60
   
Obs.* 1,  543  
 
 
*There are 1,471 observations with information on relevant experience and 1,538 observations with information on 
informal training.   38
Table 2 
 
OLS Wage  Equations 
 
 Starting  Productivity  is 
average productivity during 
the first two weeks    
Starting Productivity is 
average productivity 
during the first three 
months 
Typical worker￿s log productivity 






    
Difference between log starting 
productivity of typical worker and 








    
Union
















































    
Number of Observations  1,543  1,543 
2 R   .13 .13 
 
*High School difference is the high school indicator for the typical worker minus the high school indicator 
for the most recent hire.  The other dif variables in the table are defined analogously.  39
Table 3 
 
Selected Coefficients, Productivity Growth Equation 
 
Ln (weeks rel. experience + 1)   0.032 
(0.007) 
Ln (formal tr. hours + 1)   -0.16    
(0.10)  
Ln (informal tr. hours + 1)   -0.23        
(0.04) 




Ln (hours watch others, typical, l + 1)  -0.13        
(0.03)  
Ln (formal tr. hours, typical, + 1 )    0.23    
(0.10)  
Ln (informal tr. hours, typical, + 1)    0.12        
(0.04) 
Ln (formal tr. hours + 1) x (Tenure spline 1)            0.069        
(0.015)  
Ln (informal tr. hours + 1) x (Tenure spline 1)        0.045       
(0.014) 
Ln (weeks until fully trained,typical, + 1) x (Tenure spline 1)    0.049 
(0.012) 
Ln (watch others, typical, + 1) x (Tenure spline 1)         0.049        
(0.012) 
Ln (formal tr. hours, typical, + 1) x (Tenure spline 1)          0.018       
(0.035)  
Ln (informal tr. hours, typical, + 1) x (Tenure spline 1)        -0.36        
(0.02)  
Ln (formal tr. hours + 1)  x (Tenure spline 2)            0.009        
(0.028)  
Ln (informal tr. hours + 1) x (Tenure spline 2)        0.004        
(0.015) 
Ln (weeks until fully trained,typical, + 1) x (Tenure spline 2)    0.008 
(0.018) 
Ln (watch others, typical, + 1) x (Tenure spline 2)         0.008      
(0.013) 
Ln (formal tr. hours, typical, + 1) x (Tenure spline 2)        -0.024        
(0.026)  
Ln (informal tr. hours, typical, + 1) x (Tenure spline 2)       
      
 0.000       
(0.014)  
  
Number of Observations  4,446 
R
2   0.21 
  40
Tenure spline 1 = min(ln(t+1),ln(12+1)) 
Tenure spline 2 = max(ln(t+1)-ln(12+1), 0)  41
Table 4 
 











and log starting 
prod. of most 
recent hire (b1)  
Difference 
between prod. 
growth of typical 
worker and prod. 
growth of most 
recent hire (c1) 
Productivity 
growth of typical 
worker over the 
two year period 
(c2) 
     
























52 weeks  0.31 













n = 1518 
* Standard errors generated by bootstrapping.  42
Table 5 
Probit Equation: Probability of a Wage Change                                                               
 
  
Typical worker￿s log productivity growth 




Typical worker￿s log productivity growth 















Tenure >= 1 year   1.18 
(0.41) 
Weeks tenure x (Tenure >= 1 year)  -0.058 
(0.024) 
(Weeks tenure)





Number of Observations  1686 
 